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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) economic 
landscape, in particular the MENA highly-educated labor market, in the years preceding 
the MENA and European Refugee Crises to discern what public policies and migration 
push factors encouraged MENA refugees to re-seek asylum in Europe. I use econometric 
analysis to analyze World Bank Development Indicators, Middle Eastern University 
Data, Anabin University Data, World Bank Migration Data, and World Bank Remittance 
Data.  
I find that MENA higher education privatization significantly expanded the 
number of MENA universities, lowered the quality of MENA higher education, created 
far more college graduates than jobs requiring higher education, helped create the MENA 
labor market skills mismatch, and furthered regional unemployment— especially for 
youth and college graduates. I find that high MENA unemployment has encouraged 
displaced MENA refugees, especially those with college degrees, to seek asylum outside 
of the MENA region and in Europe. The ramifications of my findings suggest that 1) 
MENA refugees re-seek asylum in Europe for formal labor opportunities, 2) MENA 
refugees disproportionately possess college degrees, and 3) that the quality of MENA 
refugees’ college degrees may often fall below Western standards.
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1. Introduction 
In the late 1980s and early 1990’s, in order to expand higher education 
opportunities without expanding state expenditures, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and 
the Gulf states began allowing private, for-profit universities.1,2 By 2010, private for-
profit universities accounted for 70% of new MENA universities.3 The expansion of 
private for-profit universities vastly expanded university access. However, 
disproportionately wealthier and lower-achieving students enrolled in private for-profit 
universities.4 Many scholars also question the quality and economic consequences of 
MENA private universities. Manar Sabry of Buffalo University noted that, “the main 
problem with the establishment of private universities in Arab countries is that they are 
mostly for-profit and many have been established without adequate planning, clear policy 
or regulations, funds or even qualified staff” and “they neither offered innovative nor 
were they responsive to the needs of the job market.”5 
While MENA private universities expanded, MENA economies stagnated. A 
2012 IMF study found that the MENA region possessed the highest unemployment rates 
and the highest youth unemployment— over 25%— relative to other world regions. 
Higher education levels did not significantly reduce unemployment likelihoods. And, the 
                                                
1 The Middle East possesses three types of universities: free public universities, a small number of private 
non-profit universities, and private for-profit universities. 
2 Hanafi, Sari. "Universities in the Arab East: A Crisis of Privatization and Internationalization." 
Universities in Crisis Universities in the Arab East A Crisis of Privatization and Internationalization 
Comments. March 28, 2010. Accessed April 16, 2016. http://www.isa-sociology.org/universities-in-
crisis/?p=388. 
3 Hanafi. Universities in the Arab East: A Crisis of Privatization and Internationalization. 2010. 
4 Buckner, Eizabeth. "Privatization of Higher Education in Egypt." Elizabeth Buckner. January 03, 2012. 
Accessed April 16, 2016. https://elizabethbuckner.com/research/privatization-of-higher-education-in-
egypt/. 
5 Sawahel, Wagdy. "ARAB STATES: Quality Low despite Privatisation Boom - University World News." 
RSS. November 9, 2011. Accessed April 16, 2016. 
http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20111109132240914.	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2012 IMF report concluded that MENA nations continue to face a severe labor market 
skills mismatch because of regional inability to create high-skilled jobs, a four-fold 
increase in average years of schooling, and education institutions that “fail to produce 
graduates with needed skills.”6  
These stagnate MENA economies failed to integrate MENA refugee populations 
when conflicts erupted in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan after 2011. Jordan, Lebanon, 
Egypt, and Turkey (until 2016) effectively prohibited refugees from entering the formal 
labor market. These restrictions, and other refugee tribulations, led more than one million 
refugees7 and migrants8 to leave the MENA region and re-seek asylum in Europe in 2015 
alone— a unique migration due to its size and the cultural differences of European 
receiving nations.9 84% of Mediterranean Sea arrivals in 2016 came from Syria, 
Afghanistan, or Iraq.10 These arriving MENA nationalities rarely spoke the native 
languages of the top three asylum application receiving nations—Germany, Hungary, and 
Sweden. And, the female Labor Force Participation Rates (LFP) in 2010 for top refugee 
sending nations— Syria at 13%, Iraq at 15%, and Afghanistan at 15%— fell well below 
the EU’s female Labor Force Participation average of 50%.11 
                                                
6 Furceri et al. Youth Unemployment in the MENA. 2012.  
7 In the 1951 Refugee Convention, a refugee is a person who meets three characteristics: 
1. They are outside their country of origin or outside the country of their former habitual residence.  
2. They are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted. 
3. The persecution feared is based on at least one of five grounds: race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. 
8 The Oxford English Dictionary defines a migrant as “one who moves, either temporarily or permanently, 
from one place, area or co 
9Daniel Esras and Kelly Namia. "Irregular Migrant, Refugee Arrivals in Europe Top One Million in 2015: 
IOM." International Organization for Migration Online, December 22, 2015. Available at: 
https://www.iom.int/news/irregular-migrant-refugee-arrivals-europe-top-one-million-2015-iom. 
10 UNHCR. "UNHCR Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response - Mediterranean." UNHCR 
Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response - Mediterranean. February 11, 2016. Accessed February 11, 2016. 
http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php. 
11 World Bank Development Indicators 
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This paper hypothesizes that MENA higher education privatization policies 
played a major role— along with several other economic policies— in facilitating MENA 
to Europe mass-migration. I hypothesize that MENA higher education privatization 
rapidly expanded MENA private universities, flooded the high-skilled labor market, 
helped exacerbate the MENA labor market skills mismatch, contributed to crippling 
tertiary unemployment, and furthered a stagnate regional economic landscape unsuitable 
to accepting MENA refugees.  
Using country fixed effects and event study models with several datasets, this 
paper finds that region-wide higher education privatization policies led to a rapid increase 
in the number of private universities, in particular low-quality private universities. Rapid 
university expansion greatly increased tertiary education attainment, and far outpaced 
labor market demand for college graduates. This phenomenon contributed to a MENA 
labor market skills mismatch that caused high unemployment and low labor force 
participation amongst youth and college graduates. Maybe due to economic 
considerations and maybe due to political considerations, MENA nations have avoided 
resettling and/or economically integrating MENA refugees (usually Syrian, Iraqi, or 
Afghani) in any formal sector. The MENA region’s effective refugee employment ban 
has led highly educated MENA refugees to leave the MENA region and re-seek asylum 
in Europe. 
 This paper’s findings illuminate three main ramifications. Many MENA refugees 
re-seek asylum in Europe for formal labor opportunities, MENA refugees in Europe 
disproportionately possess college degrees, however the quality of MENA refugees’ 
college degrees may often fall below Western standards.
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2. Background and Literature Review 
MENA Development, University Expansion, and High-Skilled Labor Market 
In Fattah, Liman, and Makdisi’s 2000 study of Middle Eastern economic growth from 
1960 – 1998, they stated that MENA economic growth “has been both mixed and 
characterized by a higher degree of volatility in comparison with other regions of the 
world”, and that “in comparison with other regions, (Total Factor Productivity Growth) 
TFPG was not an important source of growth in the MENA region.”12 Fattah et al 
conclude that lower levels of MENA TFPG, the economic output not explained by inputs, 
resulted from low quality institutions and low-quality human capital in comparison to the 
rest of the world. They recommended that MENA nations diversify their economic base, 
fix state universities and institutions that “distorted labor market signals”, reform 
educational systems “to dispense the type of education and knowledge that is more in line 
with the requirements of modern market economies rather than one that prepares 
graduates for employment in the public sector”, and pursue “policies of greater openness 
and integration in the world economy.”13  
For various reasons over the last decades (oil dependence, authoritarianism, or 
conflict), MENA nations forwent international economic recommendations and sought 
knowledge driven, or endogenous growth models. Endogenous Growth Theory posits 
“that developing nations have a better chance of catching up with more advanced 
economies when they have a stock of labor with the necessary skills to develop new 
technologies themselves or to adopt and use foreign technology” and that “more 
                                                
12 Fattah, Zeki, Imed Limam, and Samir Makdisi. 2000. “Determinants of Growth in Arab Countries.” 
Paper commissioned by the Global Development Network for the Global Research Project on Explaining 
Growth. 26.  
13 Fattah et al. Determinants of Growth in Arab Countries. 27.	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education in the labor force increases output in two ways: education adds skills to labor, 
increasing the capacity of labor to produce more output; and it increases the worker’s 
capacity to innovate (learn new ways of using existing technology and creating new 
technology) in ways that increase his or her own productivity and the productivity of 
other workers.”14 MENA nations began to invest in public education as much as OECD 
nations and facilitated rapid expansion of private education— especially universities.  
 MENA higher education privatization policies, implemented throughout the last 
few decades, have drastically expanded private universities according to the Anabin 
University Database. The following time series graph shows growth of MENA private 
universities from 1960 to 2010.   
 
Figure 1. Private University Growth by Nation. Source: Anabin University Database. 
Private universities have almost exclusively opened in the past two decades, and really 
took off between 2000 and 2010.15 91 non-governmental universities existed in the 
MENA Anabin University Database in 2000, 38.1% of total MENA universities. 239 
non-governmental universities existed by 2010, 52.8% of total MENA universities. Some 
                                                
14 Galal, Ahmed. The Road Not Traveled: Education Reform in the Middle East and North Africa. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2008. 41. 
15 Rugh, William. "Arab Education: Tradition, Growth and Reform." Middle East Journal 56, no. 3 (2002): 
401. Accessed December 5, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329785?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. 
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of these private universities established “easy” curriculum with little coursework and 
minimal academic standards. These “easy” curriculum took advantage of MENA 
families’ strong educational values and many Middle Eastern nations like Egypt 
witnessed a rapid rise in “demand-absorbing” private universities of “compromised 
quality and low status.”16 These demand-absorbing private universities did rapidly 
expand university access and degree attainment. The number of college graduates in 
higher education privatizing nations like Saudi Arabia and Oman rose by 162 and 661 
fold since 1952 and 1970.17 
Unfortunately, the economic benefits of MENA higher education attainment 
expansion and endogenous growth rely on free markets and stable governance. MENA 
nations needed to encourage international investment, recruit businesses, or foster 
entrepreneurship to utilize their growing pools of college graduates. However, the MENA 
region resides either at or near the bottom of Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom 
Index, the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, and the World Bank’s 
Doing Business Indicators.18 Most MENA economies missed out on the macroeconomic 
benefits of expanding higher education access under the Endogenous Growth Theory 
model. As told in the World Bank’s book, The Road Not Traveled: Education Reform in 
the Middle East and North Africa: 
“the (MENA) region generally lacks significant dynamic sectors that can compete internationally 
and is home to large informal labor markets, mainly in low-level services. These characteristics 
contrast sharply with East Asia and the more dynamic economies of Latin America. Under these 
conditions, we would not expect to see a strong relationship in the MENA region as a whole 
between investment in human capital—especially investment in secondary and tertiary 
                                                
16 Barsoum, Ghada. "The Allure of 'easy': Reflections on the Learning Experience in Private Higher 
Education Institutes in Egypt." Taylor & Francis. March 16, 2016. Accessed April 06, 2016. 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057925.2016.1153409. 
17 Rugh. Arab Education: Tradition, Growth and Reform. 397.	  
18 Sami, Ben Ali Mohamed. Economic Development in the Middle East and North Africa: Challenges and 
Prospects. London: Palgrave McMillan, 2016. 10-12 
	   10	  
education—and economic growth. This turns out to be the case. Thus, the MENA experience 
brings home the idea that investment in human capital does not by itself generate economic 
growth.”19 
 
The quality of MENA higher education institutions also complicated the region’s 
Endogenous Growth Theory economic development model. Although Algeria and Libya 
expanded public universities in the 1980’s and 1990’s, most MENA nations privatized 
higher education and allowed private universities to boom. In Magdalena Karolak’s study 
of Bahrain’s university privatization reform, she finds that MENA university 
privatization “created challenges and fears over quality standards and the protection of 
consumer rights” and that “lack of proper standards and regulations could lead to the 
creation of ‘diploma mill’ institutions that exploit the public.”20  
 Either the faulty execution of the Endogenous Growth Theory or the model itself 
failed the MENA region. A 2012 IMF study found that the MENA region oversaw the 
largest unemployment rate in the world, and the largest youth unemployment rate— over 
25%. The region’s massive investment in education, and especially higher education, 
paid few dividends. Education growth did not significantly affect employment levels. The 
2012 IMF report concluded that because of regional inability to create high-skilled jobs, a 
four-fold increase in average years of schooling, and education institutions that “fail to 
produce graduates with needed skills”, MENA nations continue to face a severe labor 
market skills mismatch.21  
 
 
                                                
19 Galal. The Road Not Traveled: Education Reform in the Middle East and North Africa. 39-40. 
20 Martin, Michaela. Cross-border Higher Education: Regulation, Quality Assurance and Impact. Paris: 
International Institute for Education Planning, 2007. 15; 49.	  21	  Furceri et al. Youth Unemployment in the MENA. 2012. 	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Refugee Integration in the MENA Labor Market 
As a result of failed endogenous economic growth, four traditional MENA 
refugee-receiving nations— Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Egypt— have witnessed 
crippling economic stagnation and unemployment, especially amongst youths and college 
graduates. In these four MENA economies, a college degree increases someone’s 
unemployment likelihoods.22 
Jordan Unemployment Tertiary 
Unemployment 
Labor Force 
Participation (15 – 64) 
1995 14.60 NA 43.90 
2000 13.70 14.80 43.70 
2005 NA 24.50 42.40 
2010 12.50 34.30 44.30 
Egypt Unemployment Tertiary 
Unemployment 
Labor Force 
Participation (15 – 64) 
1995 11.30 NA 49.30 
2000 9.00 NA 49.20 
2005 11.20 NA 51.20 
2010 9.00 39.70 51.90 
Turkey Unemployment Tertiary 
Unemployment 
Labor Force 
Participation (15 – 64) 
1995 7.60 5.30 56.20 
2000 6.50 9.60 51.50 
2005 10.60 11.40 49.40 
2010 11.90 14.50 52.40 
Lebanon Unemployment Tertiary 
Unemployment 
Labor Force 
Participation (15 – 64) 
1995 8.10 NA 46.20 
2000 8.80 NA 47.50 
2005 8.20 21.20 49.70 
2010 6.20 15.30 50.70 
Table 1. Labor Statistics in Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Turkey from 1995 to 2010. Source: World Bank Development 
Indicators. Notes: NA means data not available. 
These stagnant MENA economies received the vast majority of Iraqi, Afghani, and 
Syrian refugees over the last decade. Although international aid and humanitarianism has 
helped temporarily accommodate displaced refugees, the number of displaced MENA 
residents has exponentially grown in the past five years. The escalating Syrian Civil War 
                                                
22 Furceri, Guillaume, and Ahmed. Youth Unemployment in the MENA. 2012.	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has displaced 9 million Syrians, the Iraq-ISIS war has displaced over 4 million Iraqis, and 
the ongoing Afghan-Taliban conflict has displaced over 3 millions Afghanis.23,24,25 In 
2012 and 2013, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt housed refugees in temporary, 
internationally-funded camps. In 2014 and 2015, pervasive conflict forced permanency 
on refugee populations, leading them to look for employment, homes, and citizenship that 
did not exist in their MENA host nations. Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Turkey until 2016 
effectively banned refugees from formal sector employment.26,27 Unemployment rates for 
MENA refugees and host nation native residents have skyrocketed since 2011.28 
 
Figure 2. Unemployment Rates for Syrians in Jordan in 2011 and 2014. Source: Hillesund and Stave. Impact of Syrian 
Refugees on the Jordanian Labour Market. 46. 
 In the ILO’s Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Jordanian Labor Market, Stave 
and Hillesund found that despite Jordan’s effective refugee employment ban, MENA 
refugee flows have significantly increased unemployment and lowered labor force 
participation rates in Jordan— a nation that already struggled with the two economic 
                                                
23 UNOCHA. "Afghanistan." United Nations Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. February 6, 
2016. Accessed February 10, 2016. http://www.unocha.org/afghanistan. 
24 UNOCHA. "Iraq." United Nations Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. February 6, 2016. 
Accessed February 10, 2016. http://www.unocha.org/iraq. 
25 UNOCHA. "Syrian Arab Republic." United Nations Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 
February 6, 2016. Accessed February 10, 2016. http://www.unocha.org/syria. 
26 Refugee Council. At the Breaking Point: Refugees in Jordan and Egypt. 4.  
27 USA, Refugee Council. "At the Breaking Point: Refugees in Jordan and Egypt." RCUSA. March 31, 
2015. Accessed January 27, 2016. http://www.rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/At the Breaking Point - RCUSA 
Report on Refugees in Jordan and Egypt.pdf. 
28 Hillesund and Stave. Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Jordanian Labour Market. 46.	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indicators prior to the MENA Refugee Crisis. Prior to 2011, Jordanian male labor force 
participation lay at 67%, female labor force participation at 18%, Jordanian 
unemployment at 14.5%, and Jordanian youth unemployment at 30%.29 Employers 
appear to have replaced many Jordanians, who receive a minimum monthly wage of 
$268, with cheaper Syrian laborers (an enormous supply of cheap Syrian laborers exist in 
Jordan because Jordanian labor laws confine both highly educated and less educated 
Syrians to the informal labor market). As of 2014, labor force participation (LFP) 
remained stagnant for Jordanians but total unemployment rose to 22% and youth 
unemployment rose to a staggering 42%.30  
 Economic distress on native Jordanians led the Jordanian government to ban 
working permits for any Syrians outside of refugee camps, and almost all employed 
Syrian refugees work in the informal sector— only 10% of employed Syrian refugees 
have work permits.31 Syrian LFP hovers at 27-28% and Syrian unemployment has risen 
to 60% in Jordanian cities and towns and 80% in refugee camps.32 The UNHCR’s Survey 
of Jordanian Homes,33 “Living in the Shadows,” found that Syrians in Jordan had to dig 
almost $40 into their savings per month just to live $1 below Jordan’s absolute poverty 
line. Through secondary market labor, Syrians in Jordan earned a per capita/per month 
income of 41.22 JD (58.22 USD), but spent 1.6 times more than their income for 
                                                
29 Hillesund, Solveig, and Svein Stave. "Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Jordanian Labour Market." 
Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Jordanian Labour Market. 2015. Accessed January 27, 2016. 14. 
http://www.ilo.org/beirut/publications/WCMS_364162/lang--en/index.htm. 
30 Hillesund and Stave. Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Jordanian Labour Market. 47. 
31 Hillesund and Stave. Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Jordanian Labour Market. 6. 
32 Hillesund and Stave. Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Jordanian Labour Market. 46. 
33 Living in the Shadows builds on data collected during 41,976 interviews of refugee households 
conducted byIRD in Jordan.  
UNHCR’s implementing partner International Relief and Development (IRD) 
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expenditures per capita/per month of 67 JD (95 USD).34 Despite digging into their 
savings at an average of 25.78 JD (36.61 USD) per capita/per month, Syrians in Jordan 
still spend less than the Jordanian absolute poverty line of 68 JD (96 USD) per capita/per 
month.35 Andrew Harper, the UNHCR’s Representative in Jordan, stated that “we are 
seeing Syrian refugees in Jordan having entered a downward spiral in terms of their 
ability to sustain themselves. We are concerned that this will deteriorate even further in 
2015.”36 Mohammed, a Syrian interviewee leading a family of four children, said that 
“life as a Syrian refugee in Jordan is like being in quick sand; whenever I move, I sink a 
little bit further.”37 
 In Lebanon, where refugees make up over a quarter of the population, David 
Schenker of the Washington Institute claims that unemployment has doubled since the 
arrival of Syrian refugees to 24% total and 35% of all youth. Poverty among native 
Lebanese has risen by 166% and the Lebanese government now requires Syrian refugees 
to purchase $200 six-month residency permits that restrict them from formal work.38 
Even before the MENA Refugee Crisis, many MENA workers felt compelled to 
migrate to earn wages that matched their education. Greater remittance growth than total 
MENA migrant growth likely indicates that recent MENA emigrants held higher human 
capital levels. Between 2002 and 2008, MENA remittances rose from $15.2 billions 
                                                
34 Voon, Frances. "Living in the Shadows: Jordan Home Visits Report 2014, - UNHCR." UNHCR. 2014. 
29. Accessed March 04, 2016. http://unhcr.org/jordan2014urbanreport/media-summary-english.pdf. 
35 Voon. Living in the Shadows: Jordan Home Visits Report 2014, - UNHCR. 29.	  
36 Voon. Living in the Shadows: Jordan Home Visits Report 2014, - UNHCR. 4.  
37 Voon. Living in the Shadows: Jordan Home Visits Report 2014, - UNHCR. 4.	  
38 Schenker, David. "Syria's Good Neighbors: How Jordan and Lebanon Sheltered Millions of Refugees." - 
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. September 28, 2015. Accessed February 15, 2016. 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/syrias-good-neighbors-how-jordan-and-lebanon-
sheltered-millions-of-refugees.	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dollars to $33.7 billion dollars, a 122% increase, even though average MENA migration 
only rose 37% along a similar timeline.39,40  
 
Table 2.  Remittance Flows from Developing Countries between 2002 and 2008. Sources: World Bank. Global 
Development Finance 2009 Vol I. 
If high-skilled and high-educated natives migrated from MENA nations for work offering 
suitable wages abroad, any high skilled MENA refugees from Syria, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan likely came to similar conclusions, and disproportionately migrated to the 
EU. An OECD policy brief found that while only 18% of Syrians had completed at least 
an upper-secondary education in 2010, 40% of Syrian arrivals in Sweden had completed 
at least an upper secondary education. While only 5.7% of Syrians in 2010 possessed a 
tertiary degree, 15% of Syrians in Germany possess a tertiary degree.41,42 And in 2016, 
De Wit and Altbach found that European nations perceive “refugees from Syria, Iraq, and 
the Kurdish areas … to be better educated.”43  
                                                
39 World Bank. "Global Development Finance 2009 Vol I." Global Development Finance 1 (May 26, 
2009). Accessed February 16, 2016. 55. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGDF2009/Resources/gdf_combined_web.pdf. 
40 World Bank Global Bilateral Migration Database.	  
41 World Bank Global Development Indicators 
42 Dumont, Jean-Christophe, and Stefano Scarpetta. "Migration Policy Debates." OECD. September 7, 
2015. Accessed February 10, 2016. 8. http://www.oecd.org/migration/Is-this-refugee-crisis-different.pdf. 
43 De Wit, Hans, and Philip Altbach. "The Syrian Refugee Crisis and Higher Education | De Wit | 
International Higher Education." The Syrian Refugee Crisis and Higher Education | De Wit | International 
Higher Education. January 2016. Accessed February 16, 2016. 1. 
https://ejournals.bc.edu/ojs/index.php/ihe/article/view/9109/8209. 
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3. Data 
I compiled data from several different sources into one cohesive data set— the 
MENA Higher Education Data Set (MHEDS).  The MHEDS Data Table will lay out the 
data sources that led to different variables in the MHEDS and the Data Sources section 
will briefly discuss the data source, the data gathering process, and the data cleaning 
process.  
 Before the data table discussion, I discuss why I chose to represent only fourteen 
MENA nations in the MHEDS dataset.  MENA macro-data incurs severe geo-political 
and economic limitations in data collection. The Barro-Lee Educational Attainment 
Dataset notably omitted Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza, and Oman. Those three 
nations also incurred low data collection between 1960 - 2010 to a point where their 
inclusion in the MHEDS dataset prohibited accurate statistical analysis. Consequently, I 
chose to include only the following fourteen MENA nations: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, 
Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab 
Emirates, Yemen. I notably excluded Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority from the 
dataset because those entities lacked data in two or more of the following. Table 3 lays 
out the data sources, variable types, and the number of variables used or referenced by 
this paper.  
Variable 
Category 
Variables Types Number of 
Variables 
Variable Source 
Barro- Lee 
Education Data 
• Population 
• Schooling Levels 
• Schooling Completed 
• Average Years of 
Schooling 
 http://www.barrolee.com/ 
Anabin MENA 
University Data 
• Number of Universities 8 http://anabin.kmk.org/ 
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• Quality of Universities 
• National Privatization 
Shifts44 
World Bank 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
• GDP Data 
• Unemployment Data 
• Population Breakdown 
6 http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators 
World Bank 
Global Bilateral 
Migration 
Database 
• Migration Rates 
• Immigration Rates 
4 http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/global-bilateral-migration-
database 
Polity Database • Democratic Nature 
• Regime Stability 
• Regime Changes 
• Government Openness 
2 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/
polity4.htm 
 
Table 3.  Data Table Guide Notes: Sources listed in table.  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
Universities 154 11.35065 13.28252 0 79 
Private universities 154 4.103896 8.323656 0 66 
Low-Quality Private Universities 154 1.857143 4.071949 0 20 
Private University Quality Index 82 0.9074301 0.6167514 0 2 
Unemployment Rate 42 10.81905 6.845195 0.7 29.8 
LFP 70 56.12 12.01535 41.0 87.1 
Population Growth 153 3.781899 2.659044 0.0268026 16.24807 
Percent Migrants 84 0.0848067 0.0753589 0.0097899 0.3614938 
Percent Migrants to EU 84 0.0195944 0.0356471 0.0000234 0.17757 
Percent Migrants to Gulf States  84 0.0201501 0.044591 0 0.2503321 
Percent Migrants to OECD States  84 0.0280192 0.0360829 0.0001108 0.1842231 
Log Remittances 58 6.649168 1.459542 1.759256 9.429805 
Table 4. Summary Statistics. Notes: Published regression indicator summary statistics aggregated through STATA sum 
command. 
Data Sources    
Barro- Lee Education Data 
The Barro-Lee educational attainment data follows 146 countries in 5-year 
intervals from 1950 to 2010. The data details the distribution of educational attainment of 
the adult population over age 15 and over age 25 by sex at seven levels of schooling— no 
formal education, incomplete primary, complete primary, lower secondary, upper 
                                                
44 I compiled national higher education privatization policy shifts from individual national laws and/or from 
circumstantial evidence— the founding year of the first private university.   
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secondary, incomplete tertiary, and complete tertiary. The data set also measures 
schooling at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels for each country and for regions 
in the world.  
I gathered the Barro- Lee Education Data to obtain educational attainment data 
for fourteen MENA nations. I gathered data on educational participation, completion, and 
gender in five-year intervals to describe all fourteen MENA nation’s educational 
progressions. The data required relatively little cleaning.  
 
Anabin MENA University Data 
The German Anabin database –  recognition and evaluation of foreign educational 
qualifications in English – lists and evaluates foreign higher educational institution to 
provide insight to German Universities as they solicit foreign academics. The database 
assesses foreign university degrees, university entrance qualifications, intermediate levels 
of education, and qualifications from the professional field. The database has been built 
over the last ten years, and documents 180 countries, over 25,000 institutions, 22,000 
university degrees, 25,000 individual case reports, 5,800 vocational qualification entries, 
and 1,500 secondary school leaving certificates. The Anabin database exists to provide 
German universities with data on other world universities for exchange programs, study 
abroad applications, and international hiring. The database lists registered universities in 
most countries around the world and provides a ranking, on a three-point scale45, of the 
                                                45	  The	  three-­‐‑point	  scale	  consists	  of	  three	  ratings—	  H	  +,	  H	  +/-­‐‑,	  H	  -­‐‑.	  H	  +	  indicates	  a	  university	  accredited	  both	  in	  its	  home	  country	  and	  in	  Germany.	  H	  +/-­‐‑	  denotes	  a	  university	  that	  exists	  either	  unrecognized	  in	  the	  host	  country	  or	  in	  Germany,	  and/or	  a	  university	  where	  some	  students	  possess	  accreditation	  and	  others	  do	  not.	  H	  –	  demonstrates	  an	  institution	  that	  should	  not	  have	  accreditation	  as	  a	  university	  because	  it	  a)	  lacks	  host	  country	  accreditation,	  or	  b)	  the	  education	  falls	  short	  of	  German	  higher	  education	  standards.	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university’s reputation as well as the university’s founding year. Although highly 
regarded, the Anabin MENA University Database errantly double-lists many Francophile 
MENA universities under their French, Arabic, and/or English names. Consequently, I 
double-checked all of the Anabin data with individual national registries. 
I gathered data from the Anabin MENA University Data through downloading 
country specific university-data from the website to an excel document. I went through 
all fourteen nation’s higher education registries, listed out every one of the nation’s 
accredited universities, the university’s ranking, the university’s status as private or non-
private, other unique attributes, and the university’s founding date on a comprehensive 
MENA University dataset. 
 
World Bank World Development Indicators 
The World Bank WDI collects 214 world economy development indicators from 
officially recognized international sources. It presents the most current and accurate 
global development data available, and combines national, regional and global estimates. 
I gathered information on six general economic and nation-specific indicators from the 
World Bank World Development Indicators Database that required very little cleaning.  
 
World Bank Global Bilateral Migration Database 
The World Bank’s Bilateral Migration Database presents migrant stock matrices 
from 1960 to 2000. The Database also separates data by gender and relies on the foreign-
born concept of migration— a person born in Jordan and residing in England qualifies as 
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a Jordanian migrant to England.  The data represents a collection of over one-thousand 
census and population records recorded every ten years.  
I gathered international migration related data from the World Bank Global 
Bilateral Migration Database. The Global Migration Database occurred in ten-year time 
intervals and in country specific values. I cleaned and organized this data into four 
migrant indicators— total migration, total migration to gulf states, total migration to 
OECD nations, and total migration to the European Union.  
 
Polity Database 
Polity IV scores measure the democratic nature of 167 governments from 1946 to 
2013. Polity IV represents indicators such as "factionalism", important Polity change 
events, autocratic backsliding, executive auto-coup or autogolpe, revolution, collapse of 
central authority (state failure), and successful military coups. I gathered government and 
democracy related data from the Polity IV dataset but I only selected and used two 
variables.
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4. Methods 
The Methods section lays out my research questions, my hypotheses, and the 
econometric methods I use to test my hypotheses. The Final Discussion section analyzes 
the final hypothesis through quantitative and qualitative methods because of scarce 
subject-matter data. 
 1. Did	  MENA	  privatization	  policies	  expand	  private	  universities?	  
I hypothesize that if a MENA nation begins accrediting private universities, private 
universities will rapidly expand. To test this hypothesis, I employed a country fixed-
effects regression that tested the effects of privatization on total private universities. The 
country fixed effects regression controlled for unobserved individual nation 
characteristics that do not change with time. I also included a separate time trend for each 
county to help control for unobserved differences over time and unobserved differences 
common to each country. I also utilized an event study that set the privatization policy 
implementation year to zero and graphically analyzed the growth in different types of 
MENA universities over time. Lastly, all fourteen MENA nations analyzed by this model 
all took steps to privatize their higher education system between 1960 and 2010. 
This model utilized a fixed effects model because the assumptions of a random 
effects model do not hold with the MHEDS panel dataset. The random effects model 
requires the country specific time-invariant unobservables to remain uncorrelated with 
the independent variables in the model. However, care should be taken in interpreting the 
results as potential problems may exist if countries had time-varying unobservables that 
correlated with the independent variables. For example, the UAE discovering oil greatly 
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expanded the UAE Higher Education System, and Nasserism and Arab Nationalism 
brought about MENA-wide higher education expansion as nation’s took charge of their 
futures.  
(log Private Universities)it   = ai + (Privatization)it b + ai×(yeart) + eit 
Here, ai = country specific constant (or fixed effect), b = beta— how much the 
independent variable shifts the dependent variable from the intercept, ai×(yeart) = nation 
specific time trend, eit = error of independent variables. 
  2. Did	  an	  expansion	  in	  private	  universities	  lower	  university	  quality?	  
I hypothesize that MENA’s rapid expansion of private universities with low 
accreditation measurements led to lower MENA university quality.46 To test this 
hypothesis, I utilized a country fixed-effects model time series regression that analyzed 
the effects of private university expansion on private university and general university 
quality. I again held constant regional and individual nation trends.  
(log Private University Quality Index)it   = ai + (Privatization) it b + ai×(yeart) + eit 
  3. Did	  an	  expansion	  in	  private	  universities	  further	  the	  MENA	  labor	  market	  skills	  mismatch,	  expand	  labor	  force	  participation,	  or	  reduce	  unemployment?	  
States incur numerous incentives to expanding higher education— increasing national 
human capital levels to draw businesses, creating young entrepreneurs, educating a new 
                                                
46 Anabin MENA University Data determines quality on a three-point scale consisting of three ratings— H 
+, H +/-, H -. H + indicates a university accredited both in its home country and in Germany. H +/- denotes 
a university that exists either unrecognized in the host country or in Germany, and/or a university where 
some students possess accreditation and others do not. H – demonstrates an institution that should not have 
accreditation as a university because it a) lacks host country accreditation, or b) the education falls short of 
German higher education standards.   
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generation of national leadership, and fostering a more enlightened electorate. At the 
most basic level, states hope to create more productive citizens and train their citizens to 
meet current labor market demands. Consequently, the success of privatization and 
expanding university access will manifest itself in increased labor force participation 
rates and decreased unemployment rates. However, I hypothesize that if MENA nations 
expanded private universities, then they exacerbated the MENA skills mismatch, raised 
unemployment, and lowered labor force participation.     
(log LFP)it   = ai + (Private Universities)itb + ai×(yeart) + eit 
(log Unemployment) it   = ai + (Private Universities)itb + ai×(yeart) + eit  
  3.1. Did	  an	  expansion	  in	  dubious	  quality	  private	  universities	  expand	  labor	  force	  participation	  or	  reduce	  unemployment?	  
Next, I study whether the quality of private university expansion affected labor force 
participation rates and/or unemployment. I ran a regression testing the effects of low-
quality private universities on log unemployment and log labor force participation rates. I 
hypothesize that if low-quality universities expanded, then unemployment rose and labor 
force participation shrunk.  
(log Unemployment) it   = a + (Low-Quality Private Universities)itb + ai×(yeart) + eit 
 
(log LFP)it   = a + (Low-Quality Private Universities)itb + ai×(yeart)+ eit 
  3.2. Did	  low	  quality	  private	  university	  expansion	  raise	  unemployment	  and/or	  lower	  labor	  force	  participation	  or	  did	  high	  unemployment	  and	  low	  labor	  force	  participation	  spur	  an	  expansion	  of	  low	  quality	  private	  universities?	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If private university expansion correlates with higher unemployment and lower labor 
force participation, I must next determine causality. Did the expansion of low quality 
private universities over-educate MENA residents and lead to high unemployment? Or, 
did private universities expand to take advantage of the high number of unemployed 
MENA youth who sought a higher education to improve their job market viability? 
 This model will 1) lag dubious-quality private university expansion to test the 
causality hypothesis that university expansion affected unemployment and labor force 
participation rates, and 2) lag unemployment and labor force participation rate to test the 
causality hypothesis that high unemployment and low labor force participation spurred on 
the expansion of private universities. I hypothesize that the lagged expansion of private 
and low-quality private universities led to higher future unemployment rates and lower 
future labor force participation rates. 
(Unemployment)it   = a + (Lagged Low-Quality Private Universities)itb + ai×(yeart)+ eit 
(LFP)it   = a + (Lagged Low-Quality Private Universities)itb + ai×(yeart)+ eit 
(Low-Quality Private Universities)it   = a + (Lagged Unemployment)itb + ai×(yeart)+ eit 
(Low-Quality Private Universities)it   = a + (Lagged LFP)itb + ai×(yeart)+ eit 
 3.3. Did	  rapid	  population	  growth	  lead	  MENA	  nations	  to	  expand	  universities?	  
Another causality story presented in MENA higher education literature explains that 
MENA institutions and higher education rapidly expanded to accommodate booming 
population. I hypothesize that population growth never directly instigated MENA 
university expansion. I test this hypothesis in the following statistical analysis that tests 
the effect of population growth at t0, population growth lagged 5 years, and population 
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growth lagged 10 years on universities, private universities, and low-quality private 
universities.  
(Universities)it   = a + (Lagged and Non-lagged Population Growth)itb + ai×(yeart)+ eit 
(Private Universities)it   = a + (Lagged and Non-lagged Pop Growth)itb + ai×(yeart)+ eit 
(Low-Quality Private Universities)it   = a + (Lagged and Non-lagged Population 
Growth)itb + ai×(yeart) + eit 
 4. Did	  an	  expansion	  in	  private	  universities	  expand	  migration	  and/or	  remittance	  rates?	  
MENA migration and remittance rates have risen in recent years, and I tested the 
effects of private university expansion on both MENA migration and MENA remittances, 
holding constant both year and individual nation trends. I hypothesize that if MENA 
nations expand private universities, they incur lower migration totals and higher 
remittance totals. Besides testing national migration percentage and log total remittances 
as outcome variables, I also test private university expansion’s effect on a state’s 
proportion of migrants to the EU, proportion of migrants to OECD states, and proportion 
of migrants to Gulf states.  
(log Migration) it   = a + (Privatization) itb + ai×(yeart) + eit 
(log Remittance) it   = a + (Privatization) itb + ai×(yeart) + eit 
 5. Did	  a	  lack	  of	  suitable	  regional	  labor	  opportunities	  for	  highly	  educated	  MENA	  refugees	  lead	  highly	  educated	  MENA	  refugees	  to	  re-­‐‑seek	  asylum	  in	  Europe?	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I hypothesize that if MENA refugee-receiving nations limit refugees from accessing 
the formal labor market, then increasing opportunity cost and diminishing savings 
eventually spurred MENA refugees to re-seek asylum in Europe. Because of limited data, 
I test this hypothesis through qualitative sources—reports, statistics, and scholarship.  
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5. Econometric Analysis & Results 
Question 1: Did MENA privatization policies expand private universities? 
A National Tertiary Education Policy Shift's on Log Private Universities 
  Effect on Log Private Universities 
Privatization Policy Shift 0.362** 
 (0.147) 
Observations 154 
Number of nationcode 14 
R-squared 0.809 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Country trends listed out in full in the Appendix 
Sources: Anabin MENA University Data 
Notes: The first model, a nation’s privatization policy shift’s effect on the 
number of log private universities, relied on a nation level fixed effects model 
with separate nation year trends:  (log Unemployment)it   = a + (Private 
Universities) itb + vi + eit .  
Table 5. A National Tertiary Education Policy Shift's on Log Private Universities. Sources: Anabin MENA University 
Data 
MENA privatization policy shifts caused a 36.2 percent increase in MENA 
private universities at a statistically significant level after holding constant individual 
national trends. The following graphs display the time trends of private, public, and total 
universities for all fourteen MENA nations in relation to each national privatization 
policy shift.  
	   28	  
 
 
	   29	  
 
 
Figure 3. Time-Series Graph of Individual MENA University Trends. Source: Anabin MENA University Data 
The following event study superimposes each nation’s private university growth 
on an event study graph where the privatization policy shift occurs at t0. The event study 
allows us to compare post-privatization policy university growth between nations using a 
common time axis. The event study shows us that higher education privatization policies 
in most MENA nations led to a rapid increase in private universities or expanded 
previous private university growth.  
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Figure 4. Event Study of Log MENA Private Universities Post-Privatization Policy. Sources: Anabin MENA University 
Data 
Question 2: Did an expansion in private universities lower university quality? 
A National Tertiary Education Policy Shift's Effect on Log Private 
University Quality Index 
Dependent Variables à  
 
Independent Variables ↓ 
Private University Quality 
Index 
Privatization Policy Shift 0.00664 
 (0.0173) 
Observations 82 
Number of nationcode 13 
R-squared 0.754 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Country trends listed out in full in the Appendix 
Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators, Anabin MENA University 
Data 
Notes: The first model, a national university privatization policy’s effect on log 
private university quality, relied on a nation level fixed effects model with 
separate nation year trends:  (log Private University Quality Index)it   = a + 
(Privatization Shift) itb + vi + eit .  
Table 6.  A National Tertiary Education Policy Shift's on Log Private University Quality Index. Sources: Anabin 
MENA University Data. 
The privatization of MENA universities insignificantly affected the Anabin 
University Quality Index. These results likely stem from the lack of private universities 
of any quality before the national privatization policies, which effectively cut my dataset 
by over half – from 1960 to 2010 to 1990 to 2010— and decreased the statistical 
certainty. The statistical certainty also lacked due to flaws in the Anabin data, which 
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ranks universities on a three-point scale, limiting the data’s variation and making it more 
difficult for the model to predict with certainty.  
 However, if we look at other literature and analyze the data graphically, it appears 
likely that privatization policies diminished university quality. In Education Quality in 
the Middle East, David Chapman notes that “Low quality of education is a primary 
concern and one of the greatest challenges facing education and government leaders 
across the region.”47 Higher education scholars at UNESCO worry that opening higher 
education to international markets will create quality standard concerns and lead to 
‘diploma mill’ institutions that exploit the public”48. The following event study graph 
displays the number of low-quality49 universities after privatization policies, 
superimposing low quality private university growth trends at a point of national 
privatization policy shifts of t0.  
 
Figure 5. Event Study of Low-quality Private University Growth after Privatization. Sources: Anabin MENA University 
Data. 
Question 3: Did an expansion in private universities expand labor force participation, 
reduce unemployment, or improve private returns to higher education? 
                                                
47 Chapman, David W., and Suzanne L. Miric. "Education Quality in the Middle East." International 
Review of Education Int Rev Educ, 2009, 311-44. 
48 Martin, Michaela. Cross-border Higher Education: Regulation, Quality Assurance and Impact. 49. 
49 Schools receiving a rank of H+/- or H- on Germany’s Anabin University Database.	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National Expansions of Private Universities on Log Unemployment and Log Labor Force 
Participation Rate 
Dependent Variables à  
 
Independent Variables ↓ 
Log Unemployment Log Labor Force 
Participation Rate 
Private Universities 0.0684* -0.0981 
 (0.0326) (0.0993) 
Observations 40 70 
Number of nationcode 0.590 14 
R-squared 12 0.559 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Country trends listed out in full in the Appendix 
Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators, Anabin MENA University Data 
Notes: The first model, private universities’ effect on log unemployment, relied on a nation level 
fixed effects model with separate nation year trends: (log Unemployment)it   = a + (Private 
Universities) itb + vi + eit . 
 
The second model, private universities’ effect on log labor force participation rates, relied on a 
nation level fixed effects model with separate nation year trends: (log LFP) it   = a + (Private 
Universities) itb + vi + eit.  
Table 7.  National Expansions of Private Universities on Log Unemployment and Log Labor Force Participation Rate. 
Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators and Anabin MENA University Data. 
MENA private university expansion significantly raised national unemployment 
and insignificantly lowered labor force participation rates for the age adjusted 15-64-
year-old population. These weak coefficient values may arise because a few nations 
responsibly expanded private universities with high academic standards and numerous 
quality controls— Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, and Libya. Unfortunately, other nations like 
Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen rapidly expanded private universities with no 
quality controls and incurred large increases in low-quality private universities. Figure 6 
displays national private university trends while drawing quality distinctions.  
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Figure 6. Nationalized Event Study of MENA University Growth by University Quality. Sources: Anabin MENA 
University Data. 
In order to isolate the fixed effect time series regression to nations that 
irresponsibly expanded private universities of dubious quality, I ran a regression testing 
the effects of only dubious quality private universities on log unemployment and log 
labor force participation rates.  
 
Question 3.1: Did an expansion in dubious quality private universities expand labor force 
participation or reduce unemployment? 
National Expansions of Low-Quality Private Universities on Log Unemployment and Log Labor 
Force Participation Rate 
Dependent Variables à  
 
Independent Variables ↓ 
Log Unemployment Labor Force Participation 
Rate 
Low Quality Private Univ 0.263*** -0.134 
 (0.0643) (0.197) 
Observations 40 70 
R-squared 0.739 0.554 
Number of nationcode 12 14 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
\ Data unavailable 
Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators, Anabin MENA University Data 
Notes: The first model, low quality private universities’ effect on log unemployment, relied on a nation 
level fixed effects model with separate nation year trends: (log Unemployment)it   = a + (Low Quality 
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Private Universities) itb + vi + eit . 
 
The second model, low quality private universities’ effect on log labor force participation rates, relied on a 
nation level fixed effects model with separate nation year trends: (log LFP) it   = a + (Low Quality Private 
Universities) itb + vi + eit,.  
Table 8.  National Expansions of Private Universities on Log Unemployment and Log Labor Force Participation Rate. 
Sources: World Bank Development Indicators and Anabin MENA University Data. 
In the more specifically tailored regression, we find that the MENA expansion of 
low-quality private universities raised region-wide unemployment by 26.3% at the 99% 
confidence level. The expansion of low-quality private universities carried an 
insignificant negative effect on regional labor force participation rates.  
 These results could explain two causality stories: 1) the expansion of low quality 
private universities over-educated MENA residents and led to high unemployment, or 2) 
private universities expanded to take advantage of the high number of unemployed 
MENA youth who sought a higher education to improve their job market viability.  
 The following model will lag dubious-quality private university expansion to test 
the causality hypothesis that university expansion affected unemployment and labor force 
participation.  
 
Question 3.2: Did low quality private university expansion raise unemployment and/or 
lower labor force participation or did high unemployment and low labor force 
participation spur an expansion of low quality private universities? 
Testing the Causality of Low Quality Private University Expansion, Unemployment, and Labor Force Participation Rates 
Dependent Variables 
à  
 
Independent Variables 
↓ 
Unemploy
ment 
Unemploy
ment 
LFP LFP Low-Quality 
Private 
Universities 
Low-Quality 
Private 
Universities 
Low-Quality 
Private 
Universities 
Low-Quality 
Private 
Universities 
Low-Quality Private 
Universities Lagged 5 
Years 
0.365  0.226      
 (1.154)  (0.296
) 
     
Low-Quality Private 
Universities Lagged 
 -2.255  -0.244     
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10 Years 
  (2.144)  (0.367
) 
    
Total Unemployment 
Lagged 5 Years 
    -0.0132    
     (0.0260)    
Total Unemployment 
Lagged 10 Years 
     -0.0846**   
      (0.0251)   
LFP Lagged 5 Years       -0.276*  
       (0.157)  
LFP Lagged 10 Years        -0.282 
        (0.263) 
Observations 40 40 70 70 31 24 56 42 
R-squared 0.414 0.447 0.555 0.554 0.914 0.997 0.872 0.905 
Number of nationcode 12 12 14 14 12 10 14 14 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
`Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators, Anabin MENA University Data 
Notes:  
The first model, low quality private universities’ effect on five-year-future unemployment rates, relied on a nation level 
fixed effects model with separate nation year trends:  (Unemployment)it   = a + L(5).(Low Quality Private Universities) 
itb + vi + eit .  
 
The second model, low quality private universities’ effect on five-year-future labor force participation rates, relied on a 
nation level fixed effects model with separate nation year trends:  (LFP)it   = a + L(5).(Low Quality Private Universities) 
itb + vi + eit . 
 
The third model, low quality private universities’ effect on ten-year-future unemployment rates, relied on a nation level 
fixed effects model with separate nation year trends:  (Unemployment)it   = a + L(10).(Low Quality Private Universities) 
itb + vi + eit . 
 
The fourth model, low quality private universities’ effect on ten-year-future labor force participoation rates, relied on a 
nation level fixed effects model with separate nation year trends: (LFP)it   = a + L(10).(Low Quality Private Universities) 
itb + vi + eit . 
 
The fifth model, unemployment’s effect on five-year-future low-quality private university expansion, relied on a nation 
level fixed effects model with separate nation year trends:  (Low Q Private Universities )it   = a + L(5).(Total 
Unemployment) itb + vi + eit . 
 
The sixth model, unemployment’s effect on ten-year-future low-quality private university expansion, relied on a nation 
level fixed effects model with separate nation year trends: (Low Q Private Universities )it   = a + L(10).(Total 
Unemployment) itb + vi + eit .  
 
The seventh model, labor force participation rates’ effect on five-year-future low-quality private university expansion, 
relied on a nation level fixed effects model with separate nation year trends:, (Low Q Private Universities )it   = a + 
L(5).(LFP) itb + vi + eit . 
 
The eighth model, labor force participation rates’ effect on ten-year-future low-quality private university expansion, 
relied on a nation level fixed effects model with separate nation year trends: (Low Q Private Universities )it   = a + 
L(10).( LFP) itb + vi + eit . 
Table 9.  Testing the Causality of Low Quality Private University Expansion, Unemployment, and Labor Force 
Participation Rates. Sources: World Bank Development Indicators and Anabin MENA University Data. 
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The eight models found only two significant results: 1) that an increase in 
unemployment at t0 lowers ten-year-future low-quality private university growth, and 2) 
that an increase in labor force participation at t0 lowers five-year-future low-quality 
private university growth. These results intuitively contradict each other and lend no 
credence to either causality explanation and leave open the possibilities of the following 
MENA economic storylines. MENA nations may have misjudged their future labor 
market demands, over-educated their populations, and created a deep economic sills 
mismatch. MENA regimes may have educated their citizenry as a means of appeasing 
societal unrest, and knowingly over-educated their population. Or, MENA university 
growth may have resulted from MENA’s recent population boom. According to the 
Population Reference Bureau, MENA’s population has grown the fastest in the world 
over the past 60 years, multiplying 3.7 times over— from around 100 to around 380 
million— between 1950 and 2000.50 MENA institutions and higher education may have 
rapidly expanded to accommodate booming population. However, in the following 
statistical analysis, surging population growth plays an inconsistent role in affecting 
MENA university expansion.   
 
Question 3.3: Did rapid population growth lead MENA nations to expand universities? 
MENA Population Growth’s Effect on MENA University Expansion  
Dependent 
Variables à  
 
Independent 
Variables ↓ 
Universities Universities Universities Private 
Universities 
Private 
Universities 
Private 
Universities 
Low-
Quality 
Private 
Universities 
Low-
Quality 
Private 
Universities 
Low-
Quality 
Private 
Universities 
Population 0.462*   0.479**   -0.0880   
                                                
50 Roudi, Farzaneh. "Population Trends and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa." Population 
Trends and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa. December 2001. Accessed March 03, 2016. 
http://www.prb.org/Publications/Reports/2001/PopulationTrendsandChallengesintheMiddleEastandNorthA
frica.aspx. 
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Growth 
 (0.271)   (0.215)   (0.0995)   
Population 
Growth Lagged 
5 Years 
 0.230   0.302   -0.0898  
  (0.272)   (0.217)   (0.0999)  
Population 
growth Lagged 
10 Years 
  -1.160***   -0.830***   -0.153 
   (0.308)   (0.250)   (0.120) 
          
Observations 153 139 125 153 139 125 153 139 125 
R-squared 0.828 0.844 0.879 0.739 0.772 0.827 0.739 0.773 0.810 
Number of 
nationcode 
14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
\ Data unavailable 
Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators, Anabin MENA University Data 
Notes: This first three models display population growth’s (at t0, t-5, t-10) effect on MENA total university growth, and relies on a nation level 
fixed effects model with separate nation year trends: (log universities)it   = a + (popgrowth) itb + vi + eit . 
 
Models 4, 5, and 6 display population growth’s (at t0, t-5, t-10) effect on MENA private university growth, and relies on a nation level fixed 
effects model with separate nation year trends: (log private universities)it   = a + (popgrowth) itb + vi + eit . 
 
The last three models display population growth’s (at t0, t-5, t-10) effect on MENA low-quality private university growth, and relies on a nation 
level fixed effects model with separate nation year trends: (log low-quality private universities)it   = a + (popgrowth) itb + vi + eit . 
 
Table 10.  MENA Population Growth’s Affect on MENA University Expansion. Sources: World Bank Development 
Indicators and Anabin MENA University Data. 
Only population growth in t0, population growth in the same year as university 
expansion, significantly affected university growth. Population growth in t0 raised the 
likelihood of university growth at the 90% confidence interval and raised the likelihood 
of private university growth at the 95% confidence interval. However, population growth 
at t-5 did not significantly affect MENA university growth and population growth at t-10 
significantly reduced the likelihood of university and private university expansion at the 
99% confidence level. Population growth also failed to predict national university 
privatization policy shifts.  
 If population growth led MENA nations to expand private universities, we would 
have seen population growth significantly and positively affect private university growth 
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at time periods t0, t-5, t-10, and before any national privatization policy shifts. Various 
factors, including transnational education rates, may have proved confounding variables 
for this analysis. Many MENA states, in particular oil-rich Gulf States, have expanded 
private universities in an effort to educate their expatriate population and solicit foreign 
students from the MENA region and the world.51 
 
 Question 4: Did an expansion in private universities expand migration and/or remittance 
rates? 
A National Higher Education Privatization Policy’s Effect on Migration or Remittances 
 Percent 
Migrants 
Percent Migrants 
EU 
Percent 
Migrants Gulf 
Percent 
Migrants OECD 
Remittances 
Privatization 
Policy Shift 0.00758 0.00361 -0.00419 0.00203 0.119 
 (0.0103) (0.00448) (0.0111) (0.00465) (0.255) 
Observations 84 84 84 84 58 
Number of 
nationcode 14 14 14 14 11 
R-squared 0.573 0.563 0.083 0.542 0.769 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
\ Data unavailable 
Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators, Anabin MENA University Data, World Bank 
Global Bilateral Migration Database 
Notes:  
The first model, a nation’s privatization policy shift’s effect on a nation’s percent of migrants, relied on a 
nation level fixed effects model with separate nation year trends: (Percent Migrants)it   = a + (University 
Privatization Shift) itb + vi + eit .  
 
The second model, a nation’s privatization policy shift’s effect on a nation’s percent of migrants in the 
EU, relied on a nation level fixed effects model with separate nation year trends: (Percent Migrants in the 
EU)it   = a + (University Privatization Shift) itb + vi + eit .  
 
The third model, a nation’s privatization policy shift’s effect on a nation’s percent of migrants in gulf 
nations, relied on a nation level fixed effects model with separate nation year trends: (Percent Migrants in 
gulf nations)it   = a + (University Privatization Shift) itb + vi + eit . 
 
The fourth model, a nation’s privatization policy shift’s effect on a nation’s percent of migrants in OECD 
nations, relied on a nation level fixed effects model with separate nation year trends: (Percent Migrants in 
                                                
51 Mcnamara, John, and Jane Knight, Dr. "Transnational Education Data Collection Systems: Awareness, 
Analysis, Action." DAAD. 2015. Accessed March 20, 2016. 59. 
https://www.daad.de/medien/hochschulen/projekte/studienangebote/2015_tnb_study_daad-
bc_2_data_collection.pdf. 
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OECD nations)it   = a + (University Privatization Shift) itb + vi + eit . 
 
The fifth model, a nation’s privatization policy shift’s effect on a log remittance intake, relied on a nation 
level fixed effects model with separate nation year trends: (Log Remittance Intake)it   = a + (University 
Privatization Shift) itb + vi + eit . 
Table 11.  A National Higher Education Privatization Policy’s Effect on Migration or Remittances. Sources: World 
Bank Migration Matrix, World Bank Remittance Data, Anabin MENA University Data. 
Privatization policy shifts held an insiginifanct effect on remittance and migration 
growth on a MENA-wide level. The MENA migration and remittance picture, with 
respect to the expansion of low-quality private universities, likely proved too complex 
too draw any MENA-wide conclusions. As seen in the following national time series 
graphs, individual geo-political events and vastly divergent regional economies led to 
inconsistent consequences of private university expansion. 
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Figure 7.  National Migration and Remittance Trends. Sources: World Bank Migration Matrix, World Bank Remittance 
Data, and Anabin MENA University Data. 
The following event studies combine individual national trends of MENA migrants to 
OECD, EU, and Gulf states based on a T0 privatization policy shift. It appears that 
privatization affects regional migration, but the effect’s direction depends on 
confounding national factors. For example, after gaining independence from France, 
many Algerians fled to their former colonizer, and expansion of their higher education 
system incentivized many potential migrants to remain in Algeria. However, in Iraq, 
privatization and expanded university access led to greater migration to OECD and EU 
nations because highly educated students needed to leave the stagnant state economy in 
the 1990’s to find suitable work.  
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Figure 8.  MENA Migration to the OECD Event Study Around University Privatization Policy Shift. Sources: World 
Bank Migration Matrix, Anabin MENA University Data. 
 
Figure 9.  MENA Migration to the EU Event Study Around University Privatization Policy Shift. Sources: World Bank 
Migration Matrix, Anabin MENA University Data. 
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Figure 10.  MENA Migration to the Gulf States Event Study Around University Privatization Policy Shift. Sources: 
World Bank Migration Matrix, Anabin MENA University Data. 
 
Figure 11.  MENA Migration to All States Event Study Around University Privatization Policy Shift. Sources: World 
Bank Migration Matrix, Anabin MENA University Data. 
 
Figure 12.  MENA Remittance Data Event Study Around University Privatization Policy Shift. Sources: World Bank 
Remittance Data, Anabin MENA University Data.
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6. Final Discussion 
Although constrained by scarce or outdated MENA macroeconomic data and the 
recentness of the MENA Refugee Crisis, this paper only tested the first four hypotheses 
using econometric analysis. The final discussion seeks to test the final hypothesis: 
 
A lack of suitable regional labor opportunities for highly educated MENA refugees led 
highly educated MENA refugees to re-seek asylum in Europe.  
 
MENA nations clearly face anti-refugee and anti-migrant sentiments. Nations like 
Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon already struggle with crippling unemployment and low 
labor force participation rates. Although many MENA countries shied away from 
accepting refugees and/or migrants early in the Syrian conflict,52 the war’s escalation and 
additional conflict in Iraq forced the issue. As of February 2016, over four million Syrian 
and four million Iraqi refugees have fled their home nations and sought refuge in 
neighboring MENA nations, and more than 6.6 million Syrians and 3.3 million Iraqis 
remain internally displaced and in need of assistance.53,54 Despite domestic economic 
troubles and difficult internal politics, Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, and Egypt stepped up to 
host the millions of refugees. Because of their domestic constraints, and the possibility of 
Syrian and Iraqi conflict resolution, MENA refugee host nations rarely integrated Syrian 
and Iraqi migrants into their economies. In fact, Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt either 
                                                
52 Malsin, Jared. "Why Some Arabs States Refuse to Accept Syrian Refugees." Time. September 8, 2015. 
Accessed February 10, 2016. http://time.com/4025187/arab-states-syrian-refugees/. 53	  UNOCHA. "Iraq." United Nations Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. February 6, 2016. 
Accessed February 10, 2016. http://www.unocha.org/iraq.	  
54 UNOCHA. "Syrian Arab Republic." United Nations Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 
February 6, 2016. Accessed February 10, 2016. http://www.unocha.org/syria.	  
	   45	  
legally ban or effectively ban all refugees from obtaining legal working permits. No 
official refugee labor legislation exists in Jordan, and a recent ILO study found that 
“1.7% of Syrian refugees in Jordan have work permits” and “99% of Syrian refugees 
work outside Jordan’s labour regulations and in the informal economy”.55 Any refugee 
registering with UNHCR in Lebanon for protection must sign a “no-work agreement” 
that restricts them from ever working in a formal job.56 Egypt only grants working 
permits if a refugee finds an employer to sponsor them and promise that the employer did 
not overlook any qualified Egyptians in the hiring process.57 And, in January of 2016, the 
Turkish government finally ended the ban on Syrian refugee working permits, allowing 
refugees to obtain work permits after a 6-month waiting period and limiting the percent 
of refugees a business can hire to 10%.58 Desperate for work, Syrian and Iraqi refugees 
flooded the informal labor market. Despite legal barriers, skills mismatches, and physical 
trauma, 27-28% of Syrian refugees enter the Jordanian labor force as compared to 42% of 
Jordanians.59  
                                                
55 ILO Regional Office for Arab States. "Work Permits for Syrian Refugees in Jordan." International 
Labour Organization. 2015. Accessed February 9, 2016. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_422478.pdf. 
56 Bobseine, Haley. "How Lebanon’s Residency Rules Facilitate Abuse of Syrian Refugees." Human Rights 
Watch. August 2015. Accessed February 09, 2016. https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/01/12/i-just-wanted-
be-treated-person/how-lebanons-residency-rules-facilitate-abuse. 
57 Syria Needs Analysis Project. "Legal Status of Individuals Fleeing Syria." Syria Needs Analysis Project. 
June 2013. Accessed February 9, 2016. 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/legal_status_of_individuals_fleeing_syria.pdf. 
58 Murray, Don. "High Commissioner Welcomes Turkish Work Permits for Syrian Refugees." UNHCR 
News. January 17, 2016. Accessed February 09, 2016. http://www.unhcr.org/569ca19c6.html. 
59 Hillesund and Stave. Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Jordanian Labour Market. 43.	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Table 12. Labor Force Participation Rates of Syrians in Jordan. Sources: Hillesund and Stave. Impact of Syrian 
Refugees on the Jordanian Labour Market. 45 
This rapid expansion of the informal worker labor supply curve raised 
unemployment and rapidly decreased informal sector wages— 25% of Syrians outside of 
camps and 61% of Syrians in camps make less than Jordan’s foreign worker minimum 
wage.60 
 
Figure 13.  Income Distribution of Syrians in Jordan. Sources: Hillesund and Stave. Impact of Syrian Refugees on the 
Jordanian Labour Market. 74. 
                                                60	  Hillesund and Stave. Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Jordanian Labour Market. 46.	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Although college educated and/or vocational trained Syrians had willingly entered the 
informal labor market at the beginning of the Syrian Civil War and the MENA Refugee 
Crisis, the ever-lower wages and working conditions combined with the continued 
conflict in migrant sending nations (Syria, Iraq, etc.) has led high-skilled migrants to seek 
work outside of their original asylum-granting nations and increasingly flock to more 
developed economies.61  
 
Figure 14.  European Receiving Nations for Refugees and Migrants.. Sources: Dumont and Scarpetta. Migration 
Policy Debates. 8. 
From a micro-economic approach, one would expect the highest-skilled Syrian 
and Iraqi refugees to depart MENA refugee camps and MENA refugee centers first— 
their expectation of higher wages leads them to forgo decreasing informal sector wages 
before other refugees. Moreover, higher-educated and higher-skilled workers have higher 
savings than less educated refugees, and can pay the expensive trans-Mediterranean 
migration fees— often between $2,000 and $3,000 to smugglers.62  
 The limited data on the human capital levels of arriving refugees supports these 
theoretical explanations. According to Swedish Government Officials, 40% of arriving 
                                                
61 Dumont, Jean-Christophe, and Stefano Scarpetta. "Migration Policy Debates." OECD. September 7, 
2015. Accessed February 10, 2016. 8. http://www.oecd.org/migration/Is-this-refugee-crisis-different.pdf. 
62 Bodrum, and Tripoli. "Time to Go." The Economist. September 26, 2015. Accessed February 09, 2016. 
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21667953-who-leaving-europe-and-why-time-go. 
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Syrians possess at least an upper-secondary education or higher, while as of 2010,.63,64 
And, according to Germany’s Institute of Employment Research, 15% of Syrians 
refugees possessed a vocational training or university degree as compared to 5.7% of 
Syrians who had some form of tertiary training (vocational or university degree) in 
2010.65 European and German businesses have supported the rapid integration of MENA 
Refugees due to what they perceive as high skill levels. German manufacturing giants 
Volkswagen, Daimler, and Porsche have openly praised the skill level of incoming 
refugees, advocated German politicians to open their borders, supported local refugee 
resettlement, and matched employee refugee donations.66 Daimler CEO Dieter Zetsche 
suggested that “many of those displaced by war, persecution and poverty are highly 
skilled and motivated, and may be just what the economy needs.”67  
Although the European Refugee Crisis began with high-skilled refugee laborers 
seeking employment opportunities, high-skilled migration induced a much larger MENA 
to Europe chain (or network) migration that included many less-skilled refugees. Chain 
migration occurs when consistent migration waves between two locations alter both 
areas’ livability and increases the cumulative causation of migration.68 MENA refugees 
can lower the cost of migration through sharing best practices, alerting their family and 
                                                
63 Bodrum and Tripoli. Time to Go. 
64 Barro, Robert, and Jong-Wha Lee. "A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the World." 
Educational Attainment Dataset, August 30, 2014. Accessed January 27, 2016. http://www.barrolee.com/. 65	  Delcker, Janosch, and Matthew Karnitschnig. "Refugees Won't Plug German Labor Gap." POLITICO. 
2016. Accessed February 10, 2016. http://www.politico.eu/article/refugees-wont-plug-german-labor-gap-
asylum-employment-skills-gap/.	  
66 Bloomberg. "VW, Daimler, Porsche Embrace Refugees, See Fix to Future Labor Shortages." Automotive 
News Europe. September 19, 2015. Accessed February 10, 2016. 
http://europe.autonews.com/article/20150919/ANE/150919847/vw-daimler-porsche-embrace-refugees-see-
fix-to-future-labor-shortages.	  
67 Bloomberg. VW, Daimler, Porsche Embrace Refugees, See Fix to Future Labor Shortages. 
68 Gallagher, Charles A., and Cameron D. Lippard. Race and Racism in the United States: An Encyclopedia 
of the American Mosaic. Vol. 1. A-E. Santa Barbara: Greenwood, 2014. 222. 
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friends of the easiest route, or through using European wages to pay for MENA refugees’ 
migration costs. MENA refugees can also lower the effective cost/raise the expected 
returns of migration by securing European employment from their friends and family 
before they ever migrate to Europe. In all cases, chain migration lowers the real and/or 
perceived costs of relocation to Europe, and encourages less-educated MENA refugees to 
migrate to Europe. Despite chain migration, MENA refugees to Europe remain 
disproportionately well-educated.69 
 
                                                
69 The following section will elaborate on and cite this claim.  
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7. Conclusion 
Although constrained by scarce MENA macroeconomic data and the recentness of 
the MENA and European Refugee Crisis, we successfully tested the following 
hypotheses:  
 
1. That	  MENA	  higher	  education	  privatization	  policies	  led	  to	  a	  rapid	  increase	  in	  
private	  universities.	  	  
 
This paper concludes that privatization policies rapidly expanded the total number of 
universities and especially private universities. A MENA nation’s university privatization 
policy led to a 36% increase in log private universities at the 99% confidence level, with 
country and time trend effects held constant.  
 
2. That	  MENA’s	  rapid	  expansion	  of	  private	  universities	  with	  low	  accreditation	  
measurements	  led	  to	  lower	  MENA	  university	  quality.	  
 
University privatization did not lower the MENA University Quality Index at a 
statistically significant level. However, the relative non-existence of private universities 
before privatization policy shifts limited the regression analysis and results. Through 
analyzing the data’s limitations, general trends, event studies, and other graphical 
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representation, it remains likely that privatization led to a rapid and disproportionate 
growth of low-quality universities.70  
 
3. That	  MENA	  nations	  that	  expanded	  private	  universities	  exacerbated	  the	  MENA	  
skills	  mismatch,	  raised	  unemployment,	  and	  may	  have	  lowered	  labor	  force	  
participation.	  	  
 
The MENA skills mismatch remains hard to quantify. Pissarides and Véganzonès 
found that— possibly due to a labor market skills mismatch— MENA economies tended 
to utilize their worker’s human capital in a much less efficient way than OECD and/or 
Eastern European economies.71 And, as expected in nations with high skills mismatches, 
MENA nations face much higher unemployment rates and lower labor force participation 
rates than similarly developed economies.72 I feel safe concluding that MENA nations 
face a greater skills mismatch, especially for highly educated laborers, than their 
European and/or similarly developed counterparts. And, I conclude that private university 
expansion likely exaggerated the MENA labor market skills mismatch. Private university 
expansion raised region-wide unemployment by 6.8% at the 90% confidence level and 
the specific expansion of low-quality private universities raised region-wide 
unemployment by 26.3% at the 99% confidence level. Private university expansion had 
                                                
70 In this case, Germany’s Anabin Database determined low-quality universities as universities with a H+/- 
grade or below. The H+/- grade represents universities that lack accreditation from Germany or the host 
country. H – universities lack accreditation from both Germany and the host country.    
71 Pissarides and Véganzonès. Labor Markets and Economic Growth in the MENA Region. 7. 
72 ILO. "World Employment Social Outlook." International Labour Organization. 2015. 19. Accessed 
February 10, 2016. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---
publ/documents/publication/wcms_337069.pdf.	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no statistically significant effect on regional labor force participation rates, but labor 
force participation rates trended lower as private MENA universities gained prominence.  
 
4. That MENA private university expansion greatly varied by nation but led to 
positive trends in remittance. 
 
This paper concludes that MENA higher education privatization held an insiginifanct 
and highly varied effect on migration growth on a MENA-wide level. MENA private 
university expansion demonstrated a positive, albeit statistically insignicant, effect on 
remittance growth. Growing remittances and stagnate migration trends indicate a greater 
proportion of highly educated migrants left the MENA region to find work in the years 
preceeding the MENA Refugee Crisis.  
 
5. That MENA refugee-receiving nations effectively ban refugees from accessing the 
formal labor market, and employment limitations increase refugee opportunity 
cost, diminish refugee savings, and eventually spur MENA refugees— especially 
highly educated MENA refugees— to re-seek asylum in Europe. 
 
This paper concludes that due to abnormal regional unemployment, especially 
amongst highly educated workers seeking formal employment, MENA nations 
surrounding Iraq and Syria could not have survived the political ramification of opening 
their labor markets.  
Jordan Unemployment Tertiary Unemployment 
2005 NA 24.50 
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2010 12.50 34.30 
Egypt Unemployment Tertiary Unemployment 
2005 11.20 NA 
2010 9.00 39.70 
Turkey Unemployment Tertiary Unemployment 
2005 10.60 11.40 
2010 11.90 14.50 
Lebanon Unemployment Tertiary Unemployment 
2005 8.20 21.20 
2010 6.20 15.30 
Table 13.  Labor Statistics in Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Turkey from 1995 to 2010. Source: World Bank 
Development Indicators. Notes: NA means data not available. 
Consequently, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Turkey (until 2016) all effectively banned 
the formal employment of MENA refugees and relegated all refugees, regardless of skill 
level, to informal sectors with ever deteriorating wages and working conditions. Highly 
skilled MENA refugees, restricted to low-wage MENA informal sectors, rationally began 
re-seeking asylum in nations outside the MENA region with formal sector job 
openings— European nations. Germany possesses over one million open jobs on its 
own.73 
 I conclude that the MENA to Europe migration surge likely resulted from a lack 
of formal labor opportunities in MENA refugee host nations and that a disproportionate 
number of MENA refugees re-seeking asylum in Europe qualify as highly skilled— 
college or vocational educated. Only 18% of Syrians had completed at least an upper-
secondary education in 2010, but 40% of Syrian arrivals in Sweden had completed at 
least an upper secondary education. While only 5.7% of Syrians in 2010 possessed a 
tertiary degree, 15% of Syrians in Germany possess a tertiary degree.74,75 European 
industrial leaders have testified as to higher than expected skill levels of arriving 
                                                
73 Eurostat. Ob Vacancies in Number and % - NACE Rev. 2, B-S, Quarterly Data.  
74 World Bank Global Development Indicators 
75 Dumont, Jean-Christophe, and Stefano Scarpetta. "Migration Policy Debates." OECD. September 7, 
2015. Accessed February 10, 2016. 8. http://www.oecd.org/migration/Is-this-refugee-crisis-different.pdf. 
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refugees76. And, MENA to Europe migration remains limited to those who can afford the 
$2,000 to $3,000 trans-Mediterranean smuggler fee— higher-skilled MENA workers 
likely have higher savings.
                                                
76 Bloomberg. "VW, Daimler, Porsche Embrace Refugees, See Fix to Future Labor Shortages." Automotive 
News Europe. September 19, 2015. Accessed February 10, 2016. 
http://europe.autonews.com/article/20150919/ANE/150919847/vw-daimler-porsche-embrace-refugees-see-
fix-to-future-labor-shortages.	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8. Ramifications 
This paper’s findings on MENA refugee migration push factors shine light on several 
aspects of the MENA and European Refugee Crisis. Most MENA refugees re-seek 
asylum in Europe for formal labor opportunities, MENA refugees disproportionately 
possess college degrees, and the quality of MENA refugees’ college degrees often falls 
below Western standards.  
First, most MENA refugees clearly re-seek asylum in Europe to work. Syrian 
families in Jordan dig an average of 25.78 JD (36.61 USD) per month into their savings 
and still spend less than the Jordanian absolute poverty line of 68 JD (96 USD) per 
month.77 Syrian families can find high-wage work in Europe. Job openings in top EU 
refugee-receiving nations rose from 2013 to 2015, with increased openings in high-wage 
careers.78 Germany’s top three job openings included Electrical Mechanics, Architectural 
Engineers, and Machinery Mechanics.79 
Nation 2013Q1 2014Q1 2015Q1 2015Q3 
Belgium 85,887 83,059 77,955 98,758 
Germany 944,658 1,055,002 1,091,302 1,031,291 
Greece : 15,921 : 12,626 
Spain 98,054 78,420 85,499 87,260 
Hungary 36,429 37,357 42,332 46,274 
Netherlands 96,000 104,800 126,027 129,945 
Austria 69,060 63,312 66,794 72,186 
Poland 44,010 53,899 74,027 72,863 
Finland 44,367 45,747 43,769 21,042 
Sweden 73,330 79,718 91,712 70,749 
United 
Kingdom 
481,000 593,000 713,000 757,000 
Norway 67,300 60,800 58,200 51,300 
Total 2,230,281 2,494,073 2,735,227 2,731,035 
Table 14.  2013 to 2015 European Job Openings. Sources: Eurostat. Job Vacancies in Quarterly Data 
                                                
77 Voon. Living in the Shadows: Jordan Home Visits Report 2014, - UNHCR. 29.	  
78 Eurostat. "Ob Vacancies in Number and % - NACE Rev. 2, B-S, Quarterly Data." Eurostat, Fall 2015. 
Accessed February 10, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/tps00172. 
79 Blight, Garry, and Sean Clarke. "Europe: Where the Jobs Are." The Guardian. May 30, 2012. Accessed 
March 04, 2016. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2012/may/30/europe-eu-jobs.	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And, according to industry representatives like Daimler CEO Dieter Zetsche, “many of 
those displaced by war, persecution and poverty are highly skilled and motivated, and 
may be just what the economy needs.”80 
Second, MENA refugees possess higher than average education levels. Syrian 
refugees in Jordan possess higher education levels than the average Syrian,81 and MENA 
refugees in Europe hold two to three times more secondary or higher education degrees. 
18% of Syrians had completed at least an upper-secondary education in 2010, and 40% of 
Syrian arrivals in Sweden had completed at least an upper secondary education. While 
only 5.7% of Syrians in 2010 possessed a tertiary degree, 15% of Syrians in Germany 
possess a tertiary degree.82,83 MENA refugees in Europe also possess higher than average 
savings, as the cheapest Turkey-to-Greece migration route remains above $2,000. 
Lastly, although Syrian refugees to Europe possess higher education and skill 
levels than Syrians remaining in Syria or MENA refugee-receiving nations, their skill 
levels and education levels don’t always translate to European standards. Comparative 
education studies find that primary and secondary MENA education lags behind 
European standards. According to the OECD, an eighth grader in Syria shared a similar 
education level to a third grade German.84 Moreover, at least one third of Syrian college 
graduates attended universities that earned low quality marks— the university either 
lacked university accreditation in the host country or in Germany.85 Only 2.0% of Syrians 
held university degrees in 2000, and Syrian higher education growth to 2.6% of the 
                                                
80 Bloomberg. VW, Daimler, Porsche Embrace Refugees, See Fix to Future Labor Shortages. 
81 Hillesund and Stave. Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Jordanian Labour Market. 38.  
82 World Bank Global Development Indicators 
83 Dumont, Jean-Christophe, and Stefano Scarpetta. "Migration Policy Debates." OECD. September 7, 
2015. Accessed February 10, 2016. 8. http://www.oecd.org/migration/Is-this-refugee-crisis-different.pdf. 
84 Delcker and Karnitschnig. Refugees Won't Plug German Labor Gap. 
85 Based on Germany’s internationally recognized Anabin University Database	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population by 2010 depended almost solely on the growth of Syrian low-quality private 
institutions.  
 
Figure 15.  Percentage of Syrians with College Degrees from 1960 to 2010. Sources: Barro-Lee Educational 
Attainment Database- Tertiary Education Completion in Syria 
Figure 16.  University Growth in Syria from 1960 to 2010. Sources: Anabin MENA University Data. 
More than just low quality higher educations, many education experts share 
concerns over the MENA educational system’s public sector orientation.86 Large, 
oversaturated public sectors steer higher education incentives to train bright MENA 
students towards stagnant public sector jobs instead of dynamic private-sector jobs. Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP)— the amount of a laborers’ output not explained by their 
human capital inputs and a measure of human capital usage efficiency in production— 
                                                
86 Bhattacharya, Rina, and Hirut Wolde. Constraints on Growth in the MENA Region. Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2010. 5.  
0.00.5
1.01.5
2.02.5
3.0
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Percent	  of	  Syrians	  with	  College	  Degree
05
1015
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
University	  Growth	  in	  Syria
Low	  Quality	  Public High	  Quality	  PublicLow	  Quality	  Private High	  Quality	  Private
	   58	  
trended lower in MENA nations than in OECD or Eastern European nations “due to the 
fact that human capital in MENA has suffered either from low quality or from a 
misallocation that diverted it from employment in growth-enhancing activities.”87,88  
                                                87	  Pissarides and Véganzonès. Labor Markets and Economic Growth in the MENA Region. 8.	  
88 Pissarides, Christopher, and Marie Véganzonès. "Labor Markets and Economic Growth in the MENA 
Region." London School of Economics Pissarides Papers. January 2005. Accessed February 10, 2016. 7. 
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/pissarid/papers/MAVJan05.pdf.	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9. Recommendations 
1. MENA refugee-receiving nations should respect refugees’ human rights and 
remove barriers to refugee formal employment. 
2. The international community should refuse to fund MENA refugee-receiving 
nations or repatriate MENA refuges to MENA refugee-receiving nations that 
implement refugee employment barriers. 
3. MENA nations should implement greater university accreditation standards in an 
effort to weed out low-quality universities, improve educational standards at low-
quality universities, and stem the over-production of MENA college graduates.  
4. MENA nations should reduce the size of public sectors and eliminate faulty labor 
market incentives that encourage far too many MENA residents to attend 
university.  
5. MENA nations should further private sector growth, and improve the 
entrepreneurial environment to foster a dynamic market economy that can utilize 
and employ the incoming refugee labor force.  
6. The international community should treat Syrian or Iraqi refugees with low-
quality higher education or vocational degrees from one of Syria or Iraq’s 12 and 
20 low quality private universities—around 38% of national universities in both 
nations89— as partial college graduates, who could easily become qualified 
degree-holders through supplementary or translational coursework. 
                                                
89 Data gathered from Anabin University Database.  
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10. Further Research 
This paper’s findings encourage further research on private university quality in 
the MENA region, the MENA labor market skills mismatch, misaligned incentives in the 
MENA university attendance decision-making process, employment restrictions on 
MENA refugees in MENA refugee-receiving nations, whether to discuss MENA refugees 
migrating to Europe as “re-seeking” asylum, whether European nations should accept 
MENA refugees re-seeking asylum for employment rights, the human capital of MENA 
refugees re-seeking asylum in Europe, and strategies for integrating MENA refugees into 
the European economy.  
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